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Abstract: 
This paper investigates whether companies strategically engage in corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) practices to retain employees. Under a unique setting of exogenous variations in non-
compete law enforceability in the U.S., we examine the relation between the changing 
enforceability of non-compete agreements and firms’ CSR performance. Using a difference-in-
differences design, we find that an increase in the enforcement of non-compete agreements (which 
enhances a firm’s ability to retain employees) deteriorates CSR performance. In cross-sectional 
tests, we find that peer pressure affects CSR performance interactively with the enforceability of 
non-compete agreements; specifically, the strategic role of CSR performance in employee 
retention is more pronounced for firms facing higher peer pressure (i.e., firms that are R&D 
intensive and in highly competitive industries). We further find a negative relation between the 
absolute enforceability of non-compete agreements and CSR performance. The above findings are 
consistent with the notion that firms strategically engage in CSR practices to retain employees, 
thereby reducing the knowledge spillover associated with employee mobility. 
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“Employees don't stay with a company because of benefits. It is the long-term relationship-
building that attracts people to stay.” 
- Jeff Swartz, CEO of Timberland1 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper investigates whether companies strategically engage in corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) practices to retain skilled employees. Public awareness of how businesses impact 
environmental and social conditions is growing. Outside capital suppliers use both financial and 
CSR-related information to make investment decisions. Empirical evidence suggests that 
sustainable investing has grown faster than traditional investment in the U.S. In the 2008 financial 
crisis, sustainable and responsible investing (SRI) assets outperformed professionally managed 
assets as a whole (Social Investment Forum Foundation, 2010).2 
 In addition to the intention to attract investments from outside capital suppliers, firms may 
engage strategically in CSR activities with the aim to retain their own employees. On the one hand, 
according to the neo-classical economics framework, firms require only monetary reward contracts 
to align employees’ interests with those of the firm. In that sense, investment in CSR is not related 
to employee retention. The existing literature on labor economics, finance, and management 
focuses, in large part, on using monetary incentives to retain employees (Hölmstrom, 1979). On 
the other hand, firms may use both monetary and nonmonetary incentives to align employees’ 
individual interests with organizational interests. However, empirical evidence suggests that 
                                                 
1 Jeff Swartz responded to a question about whether his company’s commitment to corporate social responsibility is 
reflected in a lower turnover rate at GreenBiz’s State of Green Business forum in Washington D.C. in Feb 2011 in 
front of a crowd of senior CSR and sustainability executives (https://www.forbes.com/sites/csr/2011/02/25/can-csr-
retain-employees/#612f62e25aa6). 
2 Socially responsible investments commonly avoid companies that produce or sell addictive substances (like alcohol, 
gambling, and tobacco) and seek out companies engaged in social justice, environmental sustainability and alternative 
energy/clean technology efforts. SRIs can be made in individual companies or through a socially conscious mutual 
fund or exchange-traded fund (ETF). 
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monetary incentives underlying the sensitivity of pay to performance have some limitations; for 
instance, monetary incentives may be an imperfect indicator of individual effort, may induce 
employees to game the system, and can be easily imitated by competitors. In this study, we argue 
that as a nonmonetary incentive, CSR can be used as an effective employee governance tool that 
helps retain employees. For example, prior literature documents that employees are willing to 
accept lower wages and pay cuts to stay in socially responsible firms (Burbano, 2016; Frank and 
Smith, 2016; Bode et al., 2015) or are more inclined to stay in such firms when faced with extreme 
negative scenarios, such as the 9/11 attack (Carnahan et al., 2017). Further, when faced with 
favorable situations (e.g., increased unemployment insurance or a rejection of inevitable disclosure 
doctrine), firms tend to increase their engagement in CSR practices in order to improve their image 
and to attract employees (Flammer and Luo, 2017; Flammer and Kacperczyk, 2019). Overall, this 
empirical evidence suggests that CSR performance plays a strategic role in retaining employees 
and reducing the risk of knowledge spillover associated with employee mobility. 
To provide large-sample, systematic evidence on the role of CSR performance in human 
resource management (HRM), this study examines whether corporate managers strategically use 
CSR to retain and attract employees and, if so, how effective this employee retaining mechanism 
is. In so doing, we take advantage of a unique setting characterized by changes in employee 
mobility across rivals and thus by the risk of knowledge spillover among them. Specifically, we 
utilize the initiation of non-compete agreements in the U.S. as an exogenous shock to the employee 
retention mechanism. Our analysis focuses on the enforceability of non-compete agreements.3 
Employee know-how is a key source of sustainable competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Hall, 
                                                 
3 As will be further explained in Section 2, non-compete agreements (also known as covenants that do not compete) 
are contracts that restrict workers from voluntarily or involuntarily joining (or forming) a new rival company after 
they depart from an existing company. 
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1993), yet high-skilled employees also render high risk of job mobility to the firm (Coff, 1997; 
Carnahan et al., 2012; Kacperczyk, 2012). Non-compete agreements are argued to be effective in 
preventing employees from switching to a rival firm (Marx, 2011); however, in reality, signed 
non-compete agreements are not guaranteed to be enforced by a court. Although non-compete 
agreements are lawful in most states, their enforceability is determined by the jurisdiction across 
different states. For example, non-compete agreements in California and North Dakota are almost 
entirely unenforceable in a court of law, whereas states such as Massachusetts and Tennessee are 
more likely to require employees to prove the unreasonableness of non-compete agreements 
(Shaikh, 2015). In a broad sense, a high enforcement level of non-compete agreements has a 
significantly negative impact on employee mobility across rivals (Marx et al., 2009; Garmaise, 
2011). 
Garmaise (2011) constructs an index based on 12 questions to measure the enforceability 
of non-compete agreements for each state in the period of 1992–2004. While the enforceability 
index of non-compete agreements can be used as a proxy for the degree of labor mobility, it is 
mostly time invariant and encounters potential endogeneity in explaining firm-level CSR 
performance. Garmaise (2011) documents four exogenous shocks to the enforceability of non-
compete agreements during the period of 1992–2004 in three states: Texas, Florida, and Louisiana. 
Specifically, the index score of Texas decreases from 5 to 3 in 1994, that of Florida increases from 
7 to 9 in 1996, and that of Louisiana first decreases from 4 to 0 in 2001 and then returns to 4 in 
2003. These four exogenous changes/shocks to the enforceability of non-compete agreements (that 
took place in the three states mentioned above) are defined based on these substantial variations 
(at least 2 score changes) of Garmaise’s index. Recent studies have adopted variations in the 
enforceability index as an exogenous shock to examine how changes in non-compete agreement 
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enforceability affect corporate governance and earnings management (Chen and Zhou, 2018; 
Shaikh, 2015). In these studies’ research designs, the value of the indicator variable equals 1 (-1) 
when enforcement increases (decreases) and zero otherwise. 
This changing enforceability of non-compete agreements provides us with a unique setting 
in which to investigate whether companies strategically engage in CSR practices. It introduces an 
exogenous variation in knowledge spillovers: the stricter is non-compete agreement enforcement, 
the less threatening is the knowledge spillover associated with employee mobility. In response to 
the threat of this knowledge spillover, firms are expected to strategically increase their CSR 
performance in order to retain employees. High CSR performance can mitigate the risk of 
knowledge spillovers by reducing employees’ concerns and improving the firm’s overall image or 
reputation capital. Accordingly, when the enforceability of non-compete agreements increases, 
firms are less motivated to engage in CSR activities to retain employees. In contrast, when there 
is less enforceability of non-compete agreements, firms are likely to devote more effort to CSR 
activities in order to attract and retain their employees. 
Due to the data availability requirement, our sample starts in 1996. As such, our analysis 
is affected by only three exogenous shocks that took place in two states in three different years, 
i.e., Florida (1996) and Louisiana (2001 and 2003). Ertimur et al. (2018) document that there are 
no other substantial variations across states in the enforceability of non-compete agreements in 
period 2004-2008.4 To ensure consistency with the enforceability index from Garmaise (2011), we 
restrict our sample period to 1996-2008 and focus only on the three shocks that occurred in Florida 
and Louisiana. 
                                                 
4 The substantial variation is defined as at least 2 score change in the enforceability index.  
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In testing our research question, we use the difference-in-differences (DiD) approach, 
which allows us to make a causal inference on the effects of the changing enforceability of non-
compete agreements on firms’ CSR performance. We measure CSR performance using Kinder, 
Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD) data. Our main finding reveals that an increase in the enforceability 
of non-compete agreements leads to worse CSR performance. This result supports the hypothesis 
that stricter non-compete agreements increase the barrier of labor mobility, decrease the concern 
of employee retention, and thus reduce firms’ incentives to engage in CSR activities. In the cross-
sectional tests, we further examine the interactive role of peer pressure with the changing 
enforceability of non-compete agreements in determining a firm’s CSR performance. Knowledge 
spillover risk is more damaging for firms with higher peer pressure (e.g., firms that are R&D 
intensive and in highly competitive industries). Our results support the prediction that the strategic 
role of CSR performance is more pronounced for firms with higher peer pressure. Specifically, 
R&D-intensive firms and firms in competitive industries tend to curtail their CSR engagement to 
a greater extent when faced with an increase in non-compete agreement enforceability. Finally, we 
examine the relation between the absolute enforceability of non-compete agreements and firms’ 
CSR performance and find strong evidence in support of the negative association between the two. 
Our study adds to the CSR literature by exploiting state-level staggered regulations that 
impact the enforceability of non-compete agreements as a quasi-natural experiment setting in 
which to apply the DiD research design. Our setting is novel in that these staggered regulations 
introduce labor mobility shocks to the skilled labor market through the changing enforceability of 
non-compete agreements. In addition, our study contributes to the existing literature by examining 
the interaction effects between non-compete agreement enforceability and peer pressure on CSR 
performance. Our evidence supports the strategic role of CSR in firms’ employee retention by 
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showing that the changing enforceability of non-compete agreements has a negative impact on 
firms’ CSR practices. Accordingly, our results lend strong support to the strategic role of CSR 
engagement in employee retention when firms face varying risk of labor mobility and knowledge 
spillover. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and develops the 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data collection and methodology. Section 4 presents the 
empirical results and robustness tests, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Relevant Literature and Hypotheses 
2.1 Institutional background of non-compete agreements 
Non-compete agreements (also known as covenants that do not compete, or CNCs) are contracts 
that restrict workers from voluntarily or involuntarily joining (or forming) a new rival company 
after they depart from an existing company. CNCs function as safeguards to protect the current 
employer’s proprietary information and reduce potential competition by prohibiting employees 
from joining a competitor in the same market or a geographical area for a determined period of 
time. 
However, in reality, a signed non-compete agreement it is not guaranteed to be enforced 
by a court. Although non-compete agreements are lawful in most states, their enforceability is 
determined by the jurisdiction across different states.5 First, a non-compete agreement is designed 
to protect a legitimate business interest (e.g., trade secrets, proprietary business information, 
                                                 
5 American Bar Association summarizes some key points that courts consider in deciding whether to enforce a non-
compete agreement: 1. Protectable Interests; 2. Ordinary Competition; 3. Consideration; 4. Reasonableness; 5. 
Signature; 6. Changed Circumstances; 7. Non-solicitation Restrictions; 8. Fairness; 9. Judicial Modification; and 10. 
Prohibition. For further details, see: 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/gpsolo/publications/gpsolo_ereport/2015/october_2015/is_noncompete_agree
ment_enforceable 
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customer goodwill). In practice, if a departed employee’s working for a competitor is unlikely to 
harm the firm’s legitimate business interest, then a court is unlikely to enforce the non-compete 
agreement. Second, employees are required to sign a non-compete agreement before employment. 
If an employee was asked to sign a non-compete agreement after his or her employment 
commenced and without being given compensation (promotion, bonus, or additional benefits), 
then the validity of the agreement may be highly questionable. Moreover, a court will render a 
non-compete agreement unenforceable when the circumstances have changed or become 
unreasonable. Finally, a court does not always invalidate the entire non-compete agreement if it is 
partially unenforceable; the court may also modify the unenforceable provisions or just highlight 
them. 
A non-compete agreement is the outcome of a bargaining game between an employer and 
an employee. Specifically, it balances the protection needed by the firm and the harm done to the 
employee (Blake, 1960). Prior empirical evidence reveals that employee know-how is a key source 
of a company’s ability to achieve and sustain competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Hall, 1993). 
However, employees with valuable skills and knowledge are more likely to be attracted to rival 
firms (Campbell et al., 2012a; 2012b; Carnahan et al., 2012; Coff and Kryscynski, 2011; Ganco et 
al., 2015). The concern is that employees with valuable knowledge are motivated to join a rival 
firm or create a new venture when faced with a sufficient increase in future wages (Kacperczyk, 
2012; 2013; Starr et al., 2018). Firms have incentives to restrict employees with valuable 
knowledge from joining a rival firm or creating a new venture of their own. For employees, the 
restrictions from joining a rival firm reduce their future salary due to the lack of a raise that 
switching jobs would afford them. Furthermore, the restriction on knowledge spillover suppresses 
future innovation and economic growth (Blake, 1960). 
 9 
In recent years, non-compete agreements have been developed and implemented in many 
U.S. states; however, their enforceability varies significantly across states (Bishara, 2011). For 
example, non-compete agreements in California and North Dakota are almost entirely 
unenforceable in their legal courts. In contrast, most other states enforce non-compete agreements 
according to specific versions of the ‘rule of reason’, which allows some variations in determining 
the enforceability of non-compete agreements. While the enforceability index of non-compete 
agreements can be used as a proxy for the degree of labor mobility, it has several limitations. 
Above all, it is mostly time invariant and encounters potential endogeneity in explaining firm-level 
CSR performance: Firms’ CSR performance may be endogenously determined by factors other 
than the enforceability of non-compete agreements. Furthermore, it can be used only at the state 
level and cannot determine whether a specific firm extensively uses a non-compete agreement in 
its employment contract. While the status of non-compete agreement enforceability remains static 
across different states, there are exceptions. For example, in the 1992-2004 period, Texas 
decreased the enforceability of non-compete agreements in 1994, Florida increased enforcement 
in 1996, and Louisiana first decreased enforcement in 2001 and then revoked the rule in 2003 
(Garmaise, 2011).6 These changes provide exogenous variations in the enforceability of non-
compete agreements when examining a manager’s behavior in response to restricted labor 
mobility. 
                                                 
6 First, in June 1994, in Light vs. Centel Cellular Co. of Texas, the Texas Supreme Court increased the requirements 
for the enforceability of non-compete agreements. Following the ruling, an employer must offer an employee specific 
consideration in exchange for a non-compete agreement. The court’s ruling also applied retroactively to all such 
agreements signed in Texas. This action quasi-exogenously decreased the non-compete enforcement score from 5 to 
3. Second, Florida strengthened the rights of employers in non-compete enforcement in 1996 (implementing, among 
other stipulations, a presumption of injury to a firm when a non-compete agreement is violated) and increased the 
enforcement score to 9 from an already high score of 7. Finally, in 2001, Louisiana decreased the enforceability of 
non-compete agreements (where employees were not prohibited from joining a competing firm in which they held no 
equity interest), and the state’s non-compete enforcement score went down from 4 to 0. However, Louisiana later 
retracted this ruling and thereby increased its enforcement of non-compete agreements in 2003, bringing the score 
back to 4. 
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A growing body of research has exploited this unique setting by using a DiD design to 
examine whether and how changes in non-compete agreements affect corporate governance and 
earnings management: For example, Garmaise (2011) finds that increasing non-compete 
agreement enforceability leads to longer CEO tenure; Chen and Zhou (2018) document that stricter 
enforcement environment increases managerial attention to short-term earnings benchmarks; and 
Shaikh (2015) investigates how changes in non-compete laws influence management forecasts of 
annual earnings. In this paper, we explore whether firms strategically engage in CSR activities 
when faced with varying enforceability of non-compete agreements. 
  
2.2 Literature review on CSR performance 
There are two compelling and competing explanations for why firms engage in CSR: legitimacy 
theory and stakeholder theory. While legitimacy theory suggests that CSR engagement is part of a 
process of legitimization, stakeholder theory perceives CSR performance as a strategy to maximize 
profits and to balance shareholders’ financial interests against the interests of other stakeholders. 
Management takes control of the whole process (including the degree of stakeholder inclusion) by 
strategically collecting and disseminating only the information it deems appropriate to advance the 
corporate image, rather than being truly transparent and accountable (Ball et al., 2000). 
Specifically, the strategic function of CSR engagement works through a two-fold mechanism: 
decreases in ‘walking’ (i.e., former employees joining a rival firm) and ‘talking’ (i.e., former 
employees disclosing the firm’s valuable knowledge when they join a rival firm) (Flammer and 
Kacperczyk, 2019). With regard to the walking aspect, CSR engagement can retain employees by 
improving the attractiveness of the work content. Empirical evidence also documents that firms 
engaging in social initiatives or environmentally friendly efforts are better able to retain employees 
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(De Roeck and Delobbe, 2012; Bode et al., 2018; Carnahan et al., 2017). As for the talking aspect, 
CSR engagement might enhance employees’ social ties and identification with their former 
organization, making them less inclined to disclose the proprietary information of their previous 
employer after joining a rival firm. Therefore, socially responsible firms are better able to foster 
employees’ commitment and retain employees (Albinger and Freeman, 2000; Greening and 
Turban, 2000; Peterson, 2004; Sheridan, 1992; Turban and Greening, 1997; Vogel, 2005; Wang 
et al., 2009). 
Public awareness of how businesses impact environmental and social conditions is 
growing. In addition to considering financial performance, investors use CSR-related information 
to make investment decisions. Empirical evidence suggests that SRI has grown faster than 
traditional investing in the U.S. In the 2008 financial crisis, SRI assets outperformed professionally 
managed assets as a whole (Social Investment Forum Foundation, 2010). Recent literature also 
documents that socially responsible firms tend to enjoy greater institutional ownership and lower 
cost of capital (Dhaliwal et al., 2011; 2012) and that these firms receive higher analyst coverage, 
as investors tend to avoid investing in sin stocks such as alcohol, tobacco, and gaming companies 
(Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009). 
In addition to the intention to attract investments, firms strategically engage in CSR 
activities with the aim to retain their employees. Past literature suggests that firms can improve 
employees’ job motivation and reduce employees’ concerns by enhancing employees’ perception 
of their current employment or by improving employees’ monitoring of their employers (Coff, 
1997). If their current employment is superior to their alternative options, employees are more 
motived to engage in their jobs and less likely to engage in adverse behavior at the workplace. 
These adverse behaviors include reduced interest, effort, or attentiveness (Rusbult et al., 1988); 
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employee theft or fraud (Dickens et al., 1989; Pierce et al., 2015; Schnatterly, 2003); or disengaged 
behavior such as using company time to do personal business or search for a better job (Acemoglu 
and Shimer, 2000; Rusbult et al., 1988). To align an individual employee’s interests with those of 
an organization, firms can use various employee governance mechanisms, including both 
monetary and nonmonetary incentives. 
Broadly speaking, the extant literature in management and economics focuses mostly on 
the design of monetary incentives. Empirical evidence suggests that tying worker compensation 
directly to firm outcomes via performance pay can help align the interests of employees with those 
of the firm (Hölmstrom, 1979). However, compensation schemes that tie pay closely to 
performance could create several problems. First, monetary incentives can be based only on 
observable variables such as outputs or profits, which may be imperfect indicators of individual 
effort – for example, output often derives from workers’ collective efforts in a team (Hölmstrom, 
1982). Second, these mechanisms create incentives for employees to game the system  (Frank and 
Obloj, 2014; Oyer, 1998), sabotage the work of their co-workers (Lazear, 1989), or engage in 
corporate misconduct (Harris and Bromiley, 2007). Third, for multiple-task jobs, employees have 
incentives to overperform on the tasks that are well rewarded and underperform on other tasks 
(Hölmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). Last but not least, monetary incentives can easily be imitated by 
competitors and hence may not be effective in sustaining a firm’s competitive advantage (Coff, 
1997). Thus, in addition to monetary incentives, firms need to strategically utilize other 
nonmonetary employee governance tools to increase an employee’s job motivation and 
engagement. 
CSR engagement can be an attractive alternative as an employee governance tool. In 
theory, individuals in large firms are concerned about the relevance of their daily work. CSR 
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activities have an explicit societal impact and can enhance employees’ sense of a meaningful 
existence and sense of belonging (Bauman and Skitka, 2012), increase their self-affirmation (Cable 
et al., 2013), and make employees perceive that their employer is acting in accordance with 
fundamental principles of justice and morality (Ellemers and Haslam, 2011). Therefore, corporate 
social initiatives should also positively influence employee retention. Recent literature has also 
revealed that CSR practices play a potentially important role in employee retention. For example, 
Brekke and Nyborg (2004) assert that CSR is a labor market screening strategy that enables firms 
to attract highly motivated and productive employees who are willing to accept lower wages 
(Burbano, 2016; Frank and Smith, 2016) or pay cuts (Bode et al., 2015) in order to work for 
socially responsible firms. When faced with negative scenarios (e.g., the 9/11 terror attacks), 
employees are inclined to stay with socially responsible firms (Carnahan et al., 2017). When faced 
with favorable situations with a lower cost of being unemployed (e.g., increased unemployment 
insurance or rejection of inevitable disclosure doctrine), firms tend to increase their engagement 
in CSR practices in order to retain employees (Flammer and Luo, 2017; Flammer and Kacperczyk, 
2019). All of these empirical studies suggest that CSR performance plays a strategic role in 
retaining employees and reducing the risk of knowledge spillovers associated with employee 
mobility. 
 
2.3 Hypothesis development 
The changing enforceability of non-compete agreements introduces exogenous variations in the 
exit barrier: the stricter is non-compete agreement enforcement, the lower is employee turnover. 
In response to changing non-compete agreements, firms need to increase employee motivation via 
HRM. HRM plays an important role in CSR and employee commitment to the organization (Jamali 
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et al., 2015). In particular, HRM plays an effective role in determining CSR by enhancing 
recruitment, retention, and productivity (Willard, 2002). Specifically, HRM and CSR converge 
around common goals and outcomes within a co-creation framework (Prahalad and Ramaswamy, 
2004; Hatch and Schultz, 2010). The CSR-HRM co-creation model maps the HRM role over three 
periods of the CSR lifecycle (Waddock et al., 2002): (1) inception and strategy setting; (2) enacting 
CSR implementation; and (3) engaging in learning or improvement through continuously 
assessing outcomes and adjusting strategy making and implementation accordingly. In the 
inception period, HR managers can contribute to defining the CSR vision and identifying relevant 
stakeholders. In the implementation period, HRM can potentially play a strategic role in raising 
employees’ awareness and readiness to implement CSR. In the learning and improvement period, 
HR managers provide opportunities for employees to express their views in relation to CSR. They 
can also contribute to CSR through their capabilities and expertise in HRM functions, including 
training and development, recruitment and selection, performance appraisal, and compensation 
(Orlitzky et al., 2006). 
In sum, the CSR-HRM co-creation model highlights the strategic role of HRM in bolstering 
CSR performance by setting the tone and facilitating the implementation of the CSR agenda. 
Empirical evidence has also shown a positive retention effect associated with corporate social 
initiatives (Bode et al., 2015). Therefore, when faced with loose non-compete laws, firms can use 
CSR as an HRM tool to improve the overall firm image and retain employees. Increased 
enforceability of non-compete agreements imposes exit barriers to retain employees, and therefore, 
firms are less motivated to engage in CSR activities in order to retain employees. Based on the 
arguments presented above, we state the first hypothesis as follows: 
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H1:  The enforceability of non-compete agreements is negatively associated with CSR 
performance, all else equal. 
 
 
In addition to facing pressure from shareholders and other outside stakeholders, managers 
face peer pressure from competitors in their industry. Peer pressure derives from both internal 
sources, such as competencies (e.g., valuable and rare resources), and external sources, such as 
competition for market shares in the industry. Both R&D and CSR are intangible assets, which are 
very difficult to imitate and substitute. R&D and CSR investments create assets that provide firms 
with competitive advantage (Branco and Rodrigues, 2006). Thus, we examine the effect of internal 
peer pressure related to R&D expenditure and external peer pressure related to market shares. 
First, empirical studies document that R&D intensity positively affects CSR performance 
in certain industries (Padgett and Galan, 2010). Therefore, R&D intensity is expected to influence 
firms’ CSR performance interactively with variation in the enforceability of non-compete 
agreements. R&D-intensive firms are faced with more peer pressure since they are more 
vulnerable to knowledge spillover risk when certain employees depart. Accordingly, firms with 
high R&D intensity are expected to decrease (increase) their CSR performance to a larger extent 
than those with low R&D intensity when the enforcement of non-compete agreements increases 
(decreases). 
Second, we investigate the CSR performance effect that arises from the CSR performance 
of peer pressure externally induced by market competition. According to the commonly held view, 
external competitiveness is defined by market shares (the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index). 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that there is a positive relation between CSR and financial 
performance (Griffin and Mahon, 1997; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). Researchers have 
proposed an alternative explanation that CSR generates a competitive advantage for firms through 
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stakeholder value creation (Freeman, 1984). Therefore, external competitiveness is expected to 
influence a firm’s CSR performance interactively with the enforceability variations of non-
compete agreements. Firms in competitive industries are faced with higher labor mobility, more 
knowledge spillover, and stronger peer pressure. Accordingly, they are expected to decrease 
(increase) their CSR performance to a larger extent when faced with stricter (weaker) non-compete 
agreement enforceability. In sum, we predict the interaction effect between peer pressure and non-
compete enforceability changes on CSR performance as follows: 
 
H2:  The negative effect of stricter non-compete enforceability on CSR performance is 
more pronounced for firms facing higher peer pressure, all else equal. 
 
3. Research Design 
3.1. Empirical specification 
Garmaise (2011) developed a ranking of each state’s enforceability of non-compete agreements 
from 1992-2004. He uses 12 questions to evaluate the enforcement level of non-compete 
agreements in each state, granting each state 1 point when its laws are above specific thresholds 
(see Appendix for further details). He classifies the level of enforcement in each state on a scale 
from 0 for no enforcement (California, North Dakota) to 9 for extremely strong enforcement 
(Florida). Ertimur et al. (2018) extend the time period (of 1992–2004) covered by Garmaise’s 
measure to 1980-2013. We use the extended measure from Ertimur et al. (2018), which is 
consistent with the Garmaise (2011) measure on the overlapping years. While the enforcement 
score can range in principle from 0 to 12 (as 1 or 0 point is assigned to 12 questions in each state), 
the Garmaise (2011) enforcement index ranges from 0 to 9, as Garmaise considers any states with 
a score of 9 to have the strongest enforcement. 
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Instead of directly using the degree of non-compete agreement enforceability in each state, 
we use the only substantial variation in the enforcement score for each state to construct the 
enforceability index for each state. In other words, we consider the only substantial change in the 
enforcement score (with absolute changes greater than or equal to 2) to be a substantial change. 
This substantial change is likely to be exogenous in that it is not controllable by individual firms. 
In this sense, its use helps us alleviate concerns about potential endogeneity. Although the state-
level enforceability index cannot determine whether a specific firm extensively uses non-compete 
agreements in its employment contract, it can still provide a solid and unique setting in which to 
investigate the overall CSR strategy of a firm within each state as a response to varying labor 
mobility. 
To examine the relation between an increase in the enforceability of non-compete 
agreements and firms’ CSR engagement, we follow the previous literature (Chen et al., 2018; 
Shaikh, 2015; Aobdia, 2018); specifically, we use a DiD design based on the exogenous variations 
in Garmaise’s rank of non-compete agreement enforceability. The regression is as follows:7 
 
𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑗,𝑖𝑡𝑋𝑗,𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑟 + 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡           (1) 
 
where CSRit represents CSR performance, and INEF is a categorical variable that ranges from -1 
for a change to weak enforcement to +1 for a change to strong enforcement, with the value of 0 
assigned to no change in the enforcement strength. The overall positive CSR performance score is 
                                                 
7 The empirical specification of model (1) can be written in a DiD research design: 
 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛼1Treatment𝑖𝑡 × Post𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2Treatment𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3Post𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑗,𝑖𝑡𝑋𝑗,𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑟 + 𝛽𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , where Treatment 
indicates states (Texas, Florida, and Louisiana) that experienced non-compete enforceability changes during 1992-
2013, and Post represents the year that the enforceability changes took place. INEF in model (1) represents 
𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐹 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡. The incorporation of state and year fixed effects in Model (1) effectively achieves a difference-in-
differences research design with a continuous treatment. 
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defined as the KLD strength score (CSR_str), which is calculated by summing all aspects of CSR 
strengths; the overall negative CSR performance score is defined as the KLD concern score 
(CSR_con) by summing all aspects of CSR concerns. Overall CSR performance (CSR_net) is 
measured by subtracting CSR_con from CSR_str. The coefficient of interest is 𝛽1, which measures 
the effect of an increase in non-compete enforceability on firms’ CSR. Hypothesis 1 predicts that 
β1 should be negative and significant. 
As mentioned earlier in Section 2.1, Garmaise (2011) discusses three major time-series 
changes in the enforcement of non-compete agreements. Texas decreased the enforceability of 
non-compete agreements in 1994, which decreased the non-compete enforcement score from 5 to 
3. Florida increased enforcement in 1996, which increased the enforcement score from 7 to 9. 
Finally, Louisiana first decreased enforcement in 2001 and then revoked the rule in 2003. Its non-
compete enforceability score first decreased from 4 to 0 and then returned to 4. Ertimur et al. 
(2018) extend Garmaise’s index to the period of 1980-2013. In this study, substantial variation in 
non-compete agreement enforceability is defined as absolute changes in the enforcement index of 
at least 2 based on Garmaise’s enforcement index over our sample period of 1992-2013. The 
categorical variable, denoted by INEF, equals 1 (-1) when the increase (decrease) in the 
enforceability index is more than 1 score (≥2) and 0 if the enforceability index remains unchanged. 
During our sample period of 1992–2013, substantial variation in the enforceability of non-compete 
agreements took place only in three states (i.e., in Texas, Florida, and Louisiana). More 
specifically, the exogenous shock, captured by INEF, takes the value of 1 for firms in Florida in 
1997–2013 and -1 for firms in Texas in 1995–2013 and firms in Louisiana in 2002 and 2003. For 
all the other firm-years in our sample, the variable INEF takes the value of 0. 
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In Equation (1), Xj,it is a set of control variables including a list of such firm-specific 
characteristics variables as total assets (TA), market value of equity (ME), Tobin’s Q (TQ), loss 
(Loss), leverage (LEV), profitability (Profit), tangibility (Tangible), cash holdings (Cash), and 
institutional ownership (IO). βr, βi, and βs are the industry (we use SIC 2-digit industries to control 
for industry characteristics), year, and state fixed effects, respectively. We cluster the standard 
errors at the state level to correct for serial correlation within firms in a state. 
 
3.2 Sample and data 
Garmaise (2011) constructs an index to measure the enforceability of non-compete agreements in 
each state based on a survey of 12 questions from 1992–2004. The index varies from 0 to 9, with 
higher ranks indicating higher enforceability of non-compete agreements. Although laws 
governing the enforcement of non-compete agreements are largely static, Garmaise (2011) 
identifies three states that experienced significant shifts in the treatment of covenants not to 
compete during our sample period of 1992–2004. Specifically, Texas increased the requirements 
for enforceability of non-compete agreements in 1994, decreasing the enforceability index from 5 
to 3; Florida strengthened the rights of employers in non-compete enforcement in 1996 and 
increased the enforcement score to 9 from an already high score of 7; in 2001, Louisiana decreased 
the enforceability of non-compete agreements from 4 to 0 and later retracted this ruling and thereby 
brought the score to 4. All of these changes in the enforceability index are at least 2 in absolute 
magnitude. Following Garmaise (2011), this study identifies exogenous shocks to this state-level 
enforceability based on substantial variations in the enforcement index (i.e., the absolute change 
in enforceability score greater than or equal to 2). This process provides a ranked measure of each 
state’s non-compete agreement enforceability. Ertimur et al. (2018) hired three law student 
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research assistants to extend Garmaise’s index to cover 1980–2013. Based on the updated index, 
only Texas, Florida and Louisiana experienced substantial variations during the sample period of 
1992–2013. 
From EDGAR, we obtain information about the state in which our sample firms are 
headquartered, starting from 1996. In Garmaise’s (2011) sample, the states in which corporate 
headquarters are located change in only 5% of the firm-years. In cases where we are not able to 
identify an insider filing,8 we rely on information on the headquarters location in 1996. We then 
obtain all firm characteristics data from Compustat. 
Next, we merge these data from EDGAR and Compustat with institutional ownership data 
from Thompson Reuters. As a proxy for firms’ CSR performance, we use the KLD index, which 
presents a binary summary of positive and negative ESG ratings (strengths and concerns) in seven 
aspects: community, corporate governance, diversity, employee relations, the environment, human 
rights and products. It also incorporates controversial business issues, including alcohol, gambling, 
tobacco, firearms, military and nuclear power. In this paper, we focus on the overall positive CSR 
performance (as captured by CSR_str) and the overall negative CSR performance (as captured by 
CSR_con) in addition to the overall CSR performance (as captured CSR_net) of our sample firms. 
The state variable represents the location of headquarters, which can be obtained through 
EDGAR. Since EDGAR starts in 1996, we assume that the headquarters location remained the 
same as in 1996 during the period of 1992–1995. Empirically, few firms change their headquarters. 
For example, in Garmaise’s sample, only approximately 5% of firms relocated their headquarters 
to other states during the period of 1992–2004. Several enforceability variations in non-compete 
agreements have occurred throughout the United States in recent years. As mentioned earlier, for 
                                                 
8 When available, we use the addresses from SEC filings (specifically insider filings in Thomson) to determine the 
location of headquarters. 
 21 
the period 1992–2004, Garmaise (2011) documents four exogenous shocks to the enforceability 
of non-compete agreements in three states: Texas, Florida, and Louisiana. Ertimur et al. (2018) 
further document no other substantial variations across states in the enforceability of non-compete 
agreements in the period of 2004–2013. 
After we exclude firms with missing data for our dependent and independent variables, the 
final sample consists of 29,214 firm-year observations for the period of 1992–2013. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at their 1st and 99th percentiles to exclude the effect of outliers. Table 1 
describes all the variables used in our study. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
3.3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 provides the distributional properties for our sample. Panel A outlines the sample 
distribution by fiscal year throughout the sample period. As shown in Panel A, the number of firms 
in our sample increases steadily from 1992 to 2002, increases almost three times in 2003, and then 
remains relatively stable starting in 2003. The reason for the dramatic increase in firms is because 
the KLD database started to include small-cap U.S. companies and the Broad Market Social Index 
in 2003. Panel B shows the firm-year distribution of the enforceability index, denoted by INEF. 
Note in Panel B that the enforceability index (INEF) has the value of -1 if a state relaxes its legal 
enforcement of non-compete agreements in year t, has the value of +1 if a state starts to legally 
enforce non-compete agreements in a stricter way in year t, and has the value of 0 if a state does 
not change its legal enforcement in year t. As shown in Panel B, out of 29,215 firm-year 
observations during the sample period of 1992–2013, the state-level legal enforcement becomes 
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stricter (INEF = 1) for 955 firm-years, becomes relaxed (INEF = -1) for 2,482 firm-years, and does 
not change (INEF = 0) for 25,776 firm-years. 
Panel C describes the firm-year distribution of the changes in the enforceability of non-
compete agreements, while Panel D describes the firm-year distribution of the changes in 
enforceability in Texas, Florida and Louisiana. Panel C shows that the majority of firm-years are 
restricted by non-compete agreements, and only one sixth of the firm-years are free from non-
compete agreements. Panel D shows that out of 29,214 firm-years, only 3,438 (= 2,483 + 955) 
experience changing non-compete enforceability. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Table 3 reports the summary statistics for all variables. Similar to descriptive statistics 
reported in prior studies (Aobdia, 2019; Shaikh, 2015), the mean net CSR score is -0.37, and the 
median is 1, showing a right-skewed distribution of the overall CSR rating. The mean and median 
of CNC are approximately 4, with a reasonable variation of the variable, as reflected in the standard 
deviation of 2.28. The mean and median of INEF are approximately 0, with a reasonable variation 
of the variable, as reflected in the standard deviation of 0.34. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
4. Main Results 
4.1 Baseline results 
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We begin our empirical analysis by investigating the relation between change in non-compete 
agreement enforceability (proxied by INEF) and firms’ CSR performance. Table 4 reports the 
results of our baseline regression of CSR performance as the dependent variable on our test 
variable INEF. Three different measures of the dependent variable are constructed based on the 
ratings of CSR performance from the KLD dataset: CSR concerns (CSR_con), CSR strengths 
(CSR_str), and overall CSR performance (CSR_net). Our key variable of interest is INEF, which 
has the value of 1(-1) if the enforceability of non-compete agreements increases (decreases) 
compared to 1992 (the first year of Garmaise’s enforcement index) and 0 if there is no change in 
enforceability from 1992 to year t. Columns 1 to 3 show the results of the baseline regression 
without controls but with the industry, year, and state fixed effects. Columns 4 to 6 display the 
results from the baseline regression with a set of controls, including the fixed effects. 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
As shown in Table 4, the coefficients on INEF are negative and significant at the 
conventional level when the dependent variable is CSR_str (columns 2 and 5) or CSR_net 
(columns 3 and 6), while they are insignificant when the dependent variable is CSR_con (columns 
1 and 4). These results suggest that an increase in the enforceability of non-compete agreements 
leads to a decrease in the KLD rating of positive and overall CSR performance (as reflected 
CSR_str and CSR_net, respectively), while it has no significant impact on negative CSR 
performance (as reflected in CSR_con). Specifically, the coefficient on INEF from the base model 
in column 3 is -0.522 and significant at less than the 1% level. This suggests that as non-compete 
agreement enforceability increases exogenously from no enforceability (INEF = 0) to a substantial 
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increase in enforceability (INEF = 1), a representative firm in our sample tends to substantially 
decrease its overall CSR performance by approximately -0.522 in terms of CSR-net. The 
coefficient on INEF from the baseline regression (with controls) with CSR_net as the dependent 
variable (column 6) is -0.590, which could be interpreted in a similar way. While the coefficient 
may seem small in absolute terms, it is sizeable in relative terms compared to the average value of 
overall CSR strength (i.e., CSR_net), -0.37 (see Table 3). The above findings are in line with the 
prediction in H1. The finding suggests that firms respond to the decreased threat of knowledge 
spillovers (associated with an increase in INEF) by decreasing their CSR engagement. In other 
words the enforceability of non-compete agreements plays an important strategic role in 
determining a firm’s CSR performance and employee retention associated therewith. Stricter 
enforcement of non-compete agreements constrains employee mobility, decreases potential 
concerns about employee retention, and thus reduces a firm’s incentive to exhibit better CSR 
performance, thereby leading us to observe a negative relation between INEF and proxies for the 
overall and positive CSR performance captured by CSR_str and CSR-net, respectively. 
Table 4 also reports the effect of the control variables on CSR performance. Following the 
CSR literature (Udayasankar, 2008; Flammer and Kacperczyk, 2019), these control variables 
account for firm characteristics such as firm size, growth or investment opportunity captured by 
Tobin’s Q, loss, leverage, profitability, asset composition, and institutional ownership. In general, 
firm size and institutional ownership are significantly and negatively related to overall CSR 
performance, and this negative association also holds for CSR strengths and CSR concerns. 
Further, Tobin’s Q is positively associated with CSR performance, as better CSR performance is 
a good signal to attract investment funds from external sources. Finally, leverage and loss are 
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marginally negatively associated with CSR performance, as they expose firms to higher financial 
risk. 
 
4.2 Cross-sectional tests: Does peer pressure matter? 
In this section, we further examine potential channels through which non-compete agreement 
enforceability influences CSR engagement at the firm level. To this end, our analysis focuses on 
whether and, if so, how peer pressure influences CSR performance interactively with the 
enforceability of non-compete agreements. Specifically, we use R&D intensity (R&D) and the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman (industry concentration) index (HHI) as proxies for peer pressure faced by 
R&D-intensive firms and by firms in concentrated industries or competitive product markets, 
respectively. R&D-intensive firms face more peer pressure because they are more vulnerable to 
knowledge spillover risk when certain skilled employees leave them and join new competitive 
peers. We construct an indicator variable, R&DH, to identify high-R&D firms, which are firms 
with R&D expenditures above the sample median. R&DH = 1 (0) means that the firm’s R&D 
intensity is above (below) the sample median, which indicates high (low) R&D intensity. We also 
construct an indicator variable, HHIL, to identify low-HHI firms based on the bottom quartile of 
HHI. Note that HHI is a measure of industry concentration and hence can be viewed as an inverse 
measure of product market competition. Specifically, HHIL =1 means that a firm’s industry 
concentration is below the 25th percentile within the sample, which means that this firm belongs 
to a highly competitive product market. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
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In Table 5, to test H2, we estimate augmented regressions with R&DH and INEF*R&DH 
(HHIL and INEF*HHIL) added to the baseline regression as in columns 1 to 3 (as in columns 4 to 
6). As shown in column 3 of Table 5, the coefficient of INEF*RDH for CSR_net (overall CSR 
performance) is negative and highly significant (-0.483; p = 0.000). As shown in column 1, the 
coefficient on INEF*RDH for CSR_con (negative CSR performance) is significant with an 
expected positive sign at the 1% level, which is also consistent with our predictions. In column 
(2), however, the coefficient on INEF*RDH for CSR_str is insignificant. Overall, the above results 
are consistent with the prediction in H2, suggesting that R&D-intensive firms tend to reduce their 
CSR engagement to a greater extent when faced with increased non-compete agreement 
enforceability. The rationale is that knowledge spillovers associated with employee mobility are 
more damaging and costlier for R&D-intensive firms; when stricter enforcement of non-compete 
agreements provides better protection of firm technology, patents and other knowledge, firms have 
less incentive to use CSR investment as a strategic tool to retain incumbent employees and to 
attract new employees. 
As shown in columns 4 to 6, we find that the coefficients on INEF_HHIL are all negative 
and highly significant. The finding is consistent with our prediction in H2, suggesting that firms in 
more competitive industries tend to decrease their CSR engagement to a greater extent when faced 
with increased non-compete agreement enforceability: Given an increase in the enforceability of 
non-compete agreements, firms in highly competitive industries are more sensitive to employee 
mobility. Accordingly, such firms tend to decrease (increase) their CSR performance to a larger 
extent when stricter non-compete agreement enforceability constrains employee mobility and the 
associated knowledge spillovers. 
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4.3 Sensitivity checks 
As our first sensitivity test, we use a continuous measure of non-compete agreement enforceability 
in lieu of a categorical measure, such as INEF, to further examine whether the enforcement level 
of non-compete agreements has an influence on a firm’s CSR engagement. Specifically, we replace 
INEF in Equation (1) with CNC (covenants that do not compete). As a continuous measure of 
CNC, we use the non-compete agreement enforceability index developed by Ertimur et al. (2018). 
Ertimur et al. (2018) update the enforceability index based on Garmaise (2011) for the period of 
1992–2004 and further construct the index for the extended period of 1980–2013. While INEF is 
a categorical variable that only has the values, -1, 0, and +1, CNC is a continuous variable ranging 
from 0 to 9 (Ertimur et al., 2018). We include the same control variables as in Equation (1) as well 
as the industry, year, and state fixed effects. 
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
Table 6 reports the results of regressions using CNC as an alternative proxy for the 
enforceability of non-compete agreements. As shown in columns 3 and 6, where overall CSR 
performance (CSR_str) is used as the dependent variable, the coefficients on CNC are negative (-
0.031 and -0.028, respectively) and significant at less than the 5% level. The same is true of the 
coefficients on CNC in columns 2 and 5 (-0.035 and -0.030, respectively). These results are 
consistent with the prediction in H1, reconfirming our main result, that is, the negative association 
between non-compete agreement enforceability and firm-level CSR performance. 
As our second sensitivity test, we conduct a robustness check on the relation between 
knowledge spillover and CSR performance across different industries. Specifically, firms 
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operating in high-technology industries are likely to experience higher growth and more 
innovation, which makes them more susceptible to knowledge spillover risk when certain skilled 
employees leave them to join competing firms. Accordingly, we test whether the relation between 
knowledge spillover and CSR performance is more pronounced in high-tech industries than in 
other industries. Similar in spirit to the comparison between high-tech versus non-high-tech 
industries, we expect that firms operating in the wholesale and retail trade industries are less likely 
to be susceptible to knowledge spillover risk. As such, we expect the effect of knowledge spillover 
(associated with non-compete agreement enforceability) on CSR performance to be relatively 
weak or insignificant. 
We construct an indicator variable HighTech to differentiate between firms belonging to 
one of the high-technology industries (denoted by SIC 2832–2837, 3611–3614, 3620–3630, 3650–
3653, 3660–3670, 4811–4823, 4831–4900, 7369–7380, 3674, and 3695) and all other firms. We 
also construct an indicator variable Trade that equals 1 for firms in the wholesale and retail trade 
industries (denoted by SIC 5000–5999) and 0 otherwise. To capture the joint effect of INEF and 
HighTech and that of INEF and Trade, we include the interaction terms INEF*HighTech and 
INEF*Trade in our baseline regression in Equation (1). Table 7 presents the estimated results of 
these augmented regressions. 
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
As shown in columns 2 and 3, where CSR_str and CSR_net are used, respectively, as the 
dependent variables, we find that the coefficients on HighTech are positive and highly significant, 
suggesting that firms in high-tech industries tend to engage more in CSR investment. More 
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importantly, consistent with our expectation, we find that the coefficient on INEF*HighTech is 
negative and significant in columns 2 and 3. This finding suggests that firms in high-tech industries 
rely on more aggressive CSR engagement as a strategy to retain incumbent skilled employees and 
recruit new employees. As expected, however, we find that the coefficients on Trade and 
INEF*Trade are all insignificant except that the coefficient on Trade is negative in column 4. The 
insignificant coefficients on INEF*Trade indicate that firms in the wholesale and retail trade 
industries are not susceptible to knowledge spillovers associated with employ mobility. In 
addition, the significantly negative coefficient on Trade in column 4 is in line with the view that 
firms in these trade industries are exposed to negative SCR performance to a greater extent than 
firms in other industries.9 
 
5. Conclusion 
Motivated by the finding of prior research that CSR could be an effective corporate governance 
tool, this study investigates a hitherto under-researched question of whether firms strategically 
engage in CSR practices to retain employees when faced with the risk of knowledge spillover. In 
so doing, we take advantage of staggered changes in non-compete agreement enforceability at the 
U.S. state level as an exogenous shock to the mobility of skilled labor and the knowledge spillover 
associated therewith. We construct a non-compete agreement enforceability index for our sample 
period of 1992–2013, which goes beyond Garmaise’s (2011) sample period of 1992–2004. 
The results of various regressions reveal that stricter enforceability of non-compete 
agreements leads to poorer CSR engagement, which is consistent with the view that firms 
                                                 
9 As an additional analysis, we also test the main result for firms that belong to the agriculture, oil and gas, and 
pharmaceutical and healthcare industries. The results (not tabulated) are comparable to those reported for the 
wholesale and retail trade industries.  
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strategically use CSR engagement to retain their skilled employees. The results of our cross-
sectional tests support the prediction that the strategic role of CSR performance is more 
pronounced for R&D-intensive firms and firms in highly competitive industries. Specifically, 
firms with more peer pressure (firms that are R&D intensive and in highly competitive industries) 
reduce (improve) their CSR performance to a greater extent when faced with increased (decreased) 
enforceability of non-compete agreements. Finally, we find a negative association between the 
absolute enforcement level of non-compete agreements and firms’ CSR performance. We also find 
that firms in high-tech industries (wholesale and retail trade industries) tend to curtail (increase) 
their CSR engagement to a greater extent when faced with increased enforceability of non-compete 
agreements. 
Our study adds to the CSR literature by providing useful insights into the strategic role of 
CSR investment in retaining skilled employees and protecting proprietary information from 
competitive peers. Moreover, the negative association observed between the absolute enforcement 
level of non-compete agreements and firms’ CSR performance lends further support to the 
strategic role of CSR performance. In addition, the use of cross-state variations in non-compete 
agreement enforceability as an exogenous shock helps to strengthen our inferences on the impact 
of knowledge spillover risk on CSR engagement. Given the scarcity of causal evidence on this 
issue, we recommend further research in this direction. 
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Appendix 
Questions to evaluate the enforcement level of non-compete agreements (Garmaise, 2011) 
 
Q1:  Is there a state statue of general application that governs the enforceability of covenants not 
to compete? States that enforce non-competition agreements outside a sale-of-business 
context receive a score of 1. 
Q2:  What is an employer’s protectable interest and how is it defined? States in which the 
employer can prevent the employee from future independent dealings with all the firm’s 
customers, not merely with the customers with whom the employee had direct contact, 
receive a score of 1. 
Q3:  What must the plaintiff be able to show to prove the existence of an enforceable covenant 
not to compete? Laws that place greater weight on the interests of the firm relative to those 
of the former employee are above the threshold. 
Q4:  Does the signing of a covenant not to compete at the inception of the employment 
relationship provide sufficient consideration to support the covenant? States for which the 
answer to Question 4 is clearly “Yes” are above the threshold. 
Q5:  Will a change in the terms and conditions of employment provide sufficient consideration to 
support a covenant not to compete entered into after the employment relationship has begun? 
States for which the answer to Question 5 is clearly “Yes” are above the threshold.  
Q6:  Will continued employment provide sufficient consideration to support a covenant not to 
compete entered into after the employment relationship has begun? States for which the 
answer to Question 6 is clearly “Yes” are above the threshold. 
Q7:  What factors will the court consider in determining whether time and geographic restrictions 
in the covenant are reasonable? Jurisdictions in which courts are instructed not to consider 
economic or other hardships faced by the employee are above the threshold.  
Q8:  Who has the burden of proving the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the covenant not 
to compete? States in which the burden of proof is clearly placed on the employee are above 
the threshold. 
Q9:  What type of time or geographic restrictions has the court found to be reasonable? 
Unreasonable? Jurisdictions in which 3-year statewide restrictions have been upheld receive 
a score of 1. 
Q10:  If the restrictions in the covenant not to compete are unenforceable because they are 
overbroad, are the courts permitted to modify the covenant to make the restrictions narrower 
and to make the covenants enforceable? States for which the answer to Question 10 is clearly 
“Yes” are above the threshold.  
Q11:  If the employer terminates the employment relationship, is the covenant enforceable? States 
for which the answer to Question 11 is clearly “Yes” are above the threshold.  
Q12:  What damages may an employer recover and from whom for breach of a covenant not to 
compete? If, in addition to lost profits, there is a potential for punitive damages against the 
former employee, the state receives a score of 1. States that explicitly exclude consideration 
of the reasonableness of the contract from the calculation of damages are also above the 
threshold.  
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Appendix – Continued  
Noncompete agreement enforcement level 
  
State 
CNC 
Index State 
CNC 
Index 
Alabama (1992–2013)  5 Mississippi (1992–2008)  4 
Alaska (1992–2013)  3 Mississippi (2009–2013)  5 
Arizona (1992–2013)  3 Missouri (1992–2013)  7 
Arkansas (1992–2013)  5 Montana (1992–2013)  2 
California (1992–2013)  0 Nebraska (1992–2013)  4 
Colorado (1992–2011) 2 Nevada (1992–2013) 5 
Colorado (2012–2013)  3 New Hampshire (1992–2013)  2 
Connecticut (1992–2013)  3 New Jersey (1992–2013)  4 
D.C. (1992–2013)  7 New Mexico (1992–2013)  2 
Delaware (1980–2013)  6 New York (1992–2013)  3 
Florida (1992–1996)  7 North Carolina (1992–2013)  4 
Florida (1997–2013)  9 North Dakota (1992–2013)  0 
Georgia (1992–2004)  5 Ohio (1992–2013)  5 
Georgia (2005–2013)  6 Oklahoma (1992–2013)  1 
Hawaii (1992–2006)  3 Oregon (1992–2013)  6 
Hawaii (2007–2013)  4 Pennsylvania (1992–2013)  6 
Idaho (1992–2008)  6 Rhode Island (1980– 2013) 3 
Idaho (2009–2013)  7 South Carolina (1992–2013)  5 
Illinois (1992–2013)  5 South Dakota (1992–2013)  5 
Indiana (1992–2013)  5 Tennessee (1992–2013)  7 
Iowa (1992–2013)  6 Texas (1992–1994)  5 
Kansas (1992–2007)  6 Texas (1995–2013)  3 
Kansas (2008–2013)  7 Utah (1992–2013)  6 
Kentucky (1992–2013)  6 Vermont (1992–2013)  5 
Louisiana (1992–2001)  4 Virginia (1992–2005)  3 
Louisiana (2002–2003)  0 Virginia (2006–2013)  4 
Louisiana (2004–2013)  4 Washington (1992–2013)  5 
Maine (1992–2013)  4 West Virginia (1992–1991)  3 
Maryland (1992–2013)  5 West Virginia (1992–2013)  2 
Massachusetts (1992–2013)  6 Wisconsin (1992–2013)  3 
Michigan (1992–2013)  5 Wyoming (1992–2013)  4 
Minnesota (1992–2013)  5   
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Table 1 
Variable Description 
 
Variables Description 
CSR_con CSR concerns from KLD ESG ratings 
CSR_str CSR strengths from KLD ESG ratings 
CSR_net Net CSR performance, calculated as CSR_str minus CSR_con 
CNC The enforceability index of non-compete agreements from Ertimur et al. 
(2018). They construct an enforceability index based on Garmaise (2011) and 
extend the time period to 1980-2013. States not enforcing non-compete 
agreements have an enforcement level of 0, and states strongly enforcing non-
compete agreements have an enforcement level of 9.  
INEF Equals -1 if a state relaxed its non-compete enforcement laws in year t, 0 if a 
state did not change its non-compete enforcement laws in year t, and 1 if a state 
implemented stricter non-compete enforcement laws in year t 
TA Natural logarithm of total assets in year t 
ME Market value of equity, calculated as the number of common shares 
outstanding multiplied by fiscal year closing price in year t 
TQ Tobin’s Q, defined as market value of equity plus book value of debt (long-
term debt plus short-term debt) scaled by book value of total assets in year t) 
Loss Equals 1 if income before extraordinary items is negative and 0 otherwise 
LEV Leverage ratio, calculated as short-term debt plus long-term debt scaled by 
total assets in year t  
Profit Profitability, calculated as operation income before depreciation divided by 
total assets in year t 
Tangible Total property, plant and equipment divided by total assets in year t 
Cash Cash and short-term investments divided by total assets in year t 
IO Institutional ownership, defined as a percentage of shares owned by 
institutions in year t  
R&D R&D intensity, calculated as R&D expenditure divided by total sales in year t 
HHI The Herfindahl Index 
R&DH An indicator variable that is equal to 1 if R&D expenses scaled by total assets 
is above the median and 0 otherwise 
HHIL An indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the Herfindahl index is in the sample 
bottom quartile and 0 otherwise 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A 
Year Distribution 
Fiscal Year Freq. Percent Cum. 
1992 228 0.78 0.78 
1993 235 0.80 1.58 
1994 240 0.82 2.41 
1995 404 1.38 3.79 
1996 429 1.47 5.26 
1997 437 1.50 6.75 
1998 453 1.55 8.30 
1999 460 1.57 9.88 
2000 434 1.49 11.36 
2001 803 2.75 14.11 
2002 835 2.86 16.97 
2003 2,227 7.62 24.59 
2004 2,283 7.81 32.41 
2005 2,223 7.61 40.02 
2006 2,211 7.57 47.59 
2007 2,184 7.48 55.06 
2008 2,261 7.74 62.80 
2009 2,288 7.83 70.63 
2010 2,317 7.93 78.57 
2011 2,161 7.40 85.96 
2012 2,171 7.43 93.39 
2013 1,930 6.61 100.00 
Total 29,214 100.00  
 
 
Panel B 
Summary Statistics of variations in non-compete enforceability 
INEF Freq. Percent Cum. 
-1 2,483 8.50 8.50 
0 25,776 88.23 96.73 
1 955 3.27 100.00 
Total 29,214 100.00  
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Table 2 – Continued  
 
Panel C 
Summary Statistics of non-compete enforceability 
CNC Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 5,438 18.61 18.61 
1 265 0.91 19.52 
2 1,125 3.85 23.37 
3 6,957 23.81 47.19 
4 3,842 13.15 60.34 
5 5,223 17.88 78.22 
6 4,644 15.90 94.11 
7 765 2.62 96.73 
9 955 3.27 100.00 
Total 29,214 100.00  
 
 
Panel D 
Summary Statistics of variations in non-compete enforceability in Texas, Florida and Louisiana 
INEF -1 0 1 Total 
FL 0 45 955 1,000 
LA 26 239 0 265 
TX 2,457 48 0 2,505 
Total 2,483 332 955 3,770 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable n Mean S.D. Min 25% Med. 75% Max 
CSR_con 29,214 1.88 1.91 0.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 18.00 
CSR_str 29,214 1.51 2.32 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 22.00 
CSR_net 29,214 -0.37 2.47 -12.00 -2.00 1.00 1.00 19.00 
INEF 29,214 -0.05 0.34 -1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
CNC 29,214 3.65 2.28 0.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 9.00 
TA 29,214 7.34 1.72 3.16 6.07 7.25 8.43 13.20 
TQ 29,214 1.43 1.45 0.01 0.51 0.99 1.81 14.99 
Loss 29,214 0.20 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
LEV 29,214 2.32 4.09 -14.71 0.50 1.11 2.36 37.95 
Profit  29,214 0.02 0.14 -1.73 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.29 
Tangible 29,214 0.24 0.24 0.00 0.05 0.16 0.37 0.92 
Cash 29,214 0.18 0.20 0.00 0.03 0.09 0.25 1.00 
IO 29,214 0.66 0.25 0.00 0.49 0.70 0.85 1.27 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the variables defined in Table 1. 
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Table 4 
Baseline Results 
 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable CSR_con CSR_str CSR_net CSR_con CSR_str CSR_net 
INEF -0.008 -0.530* -0.522*** -0.186 -0.776 -0.590** 
 [0.958] [0.053] [0.001] [0.571] [0.158] [0.017] 
TA    0.602*** 0.891*** 0.289*** 
    [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
TQ    0.026** 0.171*** 0.145*** 
    [0.039] [0.000] [0.000] 
Loss    0.124*** -0.047 -0.171*** 
    [0.008] [0.308] [0.001] 
LEV    -0.008 -0.011* -0.002 
    [0.127] [0.054] [0.781] 
Profit    -0.172 0.245 0.417** 
    [0.314] [0.101] [0.035] 
Tangible    -0.076 0.259 0.335 
    [0.698] [0.233] [0.181] 
Cash    0.431*** 0.739*** 0.308 
    [0.000] [0.000] [0.155] 
IO    -0.559*** -1.067*** -0.508*** 
    [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered by State Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 29,214 29,214 29,214 29,214 29,214 29,214 
Adjusted R2 0.200 0.074 0.126 0.381 0.343 0.156 
This table reports the results of the cross-sectional test of the association between the enforceability of non-
compete agreements and firm CSR performance (CSR_con, CSR_str, CSR_net) and whether adding 
financial characteristics significantly increases the explanatory power (adjusted R2). All variables are 
defined in Table 1, where all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Industry 
fixed effects (FE) are determined using SIC 2-digit industries. P-values are reported in parentheses and are 
based on robust standard errors (clustered by state). ***, **, and * denote significance at p < 0.01, p < 0.05, 
and p < 0.10, respectively. 
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Table 5 
Cross-sectional study of peer pressure 
 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable CSR_con CSR_str CSR_net CSR_con CSR_str CSR_net 
INEF -0.671*** -0.884* -0.213 -0.163 -0.656 -0.493* 
 [0.001] [0.069] [0.500] [0.630] [0.274] [0.079] 
INEF*R&DH 0.601*** 0.118 -0.483***    
 [0.001] [0.223] [0.000]    
R&D -0.048*** -0.024* 0.024**    
 [0.000] [0.053] [0.042]    
INEF*HHIL    -0.126** -0.562*** -0.436*** 
    [0.023] [0.003] [0.010] 
HHI    -0.104 -0.078 0.026 
    [0.267] [0.357] [0.825] 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered by State Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 29,214 29,214 29,214 29,214 29,214 29,214 
Adjusted R2 0.384 0.344 0.157 0.381 0.345 0.157 
This table reports the results of the cross-sectional test of the association between the interaction effects of 
R&D intensity and market competitiveness with non-compete agreement enforceability on firms’ CSR 
performance. High-R&D firms (R&DH) is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm’s R&D expenditure 
is above the median and zero otherwise. Low-HHI firms (HHIL) is an indicator variable that equals one if 
a firm’s HHI is in the bottom quartile of HHI and zero otherwise. As HHI measures industry concentration, 
it can be viewed as an inverse measure of product market competition. Hence, HHIL = 1 means that a firm’s 
industry concentration is below the 25th percentile within the sample or industry competition is in the top 
quartile within the sample. All remaining variables are defined in Table 1, and continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Industry fixed effects (FE) are determined using SIC 2-digit 
industries. P-values are reported in parentheses and are based on robust standard errors (clustered by state). 
***, **, and * denote significance at p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.10, respectively. The controls include 
the same set of controls as in Table 4. 
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Table 6 
Cross-sectional study of enforceability index 
 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable CSR_con CSR_str CSR_net CSR_con CSR_str CSR_net 
CNC -0.004 -0.035** -0.031** -0.002 -0.030** -0.028** 
 [0.714] [0.024] [0.033] [0.783] [0.010] [0.047] 
TA    0.606*** 0.891*** 0.285*** 
    [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
LEV    -0.009* -0.010 -0.0001 
    [0.070] [0.101] [0.949] 
TQ    0.023 0.174*** 0.151*** 
    [0.107] [0.000] [0.000] 
Loss    0.116*** -0.034 -0.150*** 
    [0.005] [0.404] [0.004] 
Profit    -0.187* 0.240* 0.427*** 
    [0.097] [0.075] [0.009] 
Tangible    -0.040 0.181 0.221 
    [0.811] [0.294] [0.322] 
Cash    0.435*** 0.885*** 0.450** 
    [0.000] [0.000] [0.011] 
IO    -0.559*** -1.054*** -0.496*** 
    [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered by State Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 29,214 29,214 29,214 29,214 29,214 29,214 
Adjusted R2 0.184 0.059 0.110 0.371 0.333 0.140 
This table reports the results of the cross-sectional test of the association between absolute non-compete 
agreement enforceability and firms’ CSR performance. CNC is the enforceability index, reconstructed by 
Ertimur et al. (2018) based on Garmaise (2011). All variables are defined in Table 1, and all continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Industry fixed effects (FE) are determined using 
SIC 2-digit industries. P-values are reported in parentheses and are based on robust standard errors 
(clustered by state). ***, **, and * denote significance at p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.10, respectively. 
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Table 7 
Cross-sectional sensitivity tests in different industries  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CSR_con CSR_str CSR_net CSR_con CSR_str CSR_net 
INEF -0.162 -0.779 -0.617 -0.164 -0.808 -0.644 
 [0.400] [0.178] [0.146] [0.377] [0.146] [0.117] 
INEF*HighTech -0.083 -0.516** -0.433**    
 [0.212] [0.042] [0.035]    
HighTech -0.061 0.283*** 0.344***    
 [0.479] [0.002] [0.000]    
INEF*Trade    -0.028 -0.090 -0.062 
    [0.625] [0.465] [0.711] 
Trade    -0.178** -0.166 0.012 
    [0.042] [0.182] [0.927] 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered by state Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 29,214 29,214 29,214 29,214 29,214 29,214 
Adjusted R2 0.301 0.307 0.116 0.301 0.305 0.113 
This table reports the results of the cross-sectional test of the association between the enforceability of non-
compete agreements and firm CSR performance for two industries. The dummy variable HighTech 
indicates that a firm belongs to high-tech industries (denoted by SIC 2832–2837, 3611–3614, 3620–3630, 
3650–3653, 3660–3670, 4811–4823, 4831–4900, 7369–7380, 3674, and 3695), and INEF*HighTech is the 
interaction term between INEF and HighTech. The dummy variable Trade indicates that a firm belongs to 
the wholesale and retail trade industries (denoted by SIC 5000–5999), and INEF*Trade is the interaction 
term between INEF and Trade. All remaining variables are defined in Table 1. P-values are reported in 
parentheses and are based on robust standard errors (clustered by state). ***, **, and * denote significance 
at p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.10, respectively. The controls include the same set of controls as in Table 
4. 
